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Abstract 
 
It is unclear whether the common belief that experience benefits new product development 
performance is driven by decision-makers allocating more attention to success experience or more 
attention to failure experience. This paper differentiates between the two aforementioned types of 
experience in order to explore their separate effects on new product development performance. 
We find that only late-stage failure experience improves performance, that success experience is 
more beneficial than late-stage failure experience and that, while others’ related failure experience 
increases the likelihood of failure, others’ related success experience decreases it. We conducted 
our research in the context of drug development in the biotech industry and obtained our data from 
Pharma Projects. 
Keywords: Failure, Success, New product development, Others’ experience 
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Introduction 
 
On December 2, 2006, Pfizer discovered during phase III trials that one of the most 
promising projects in its pipeline, torcetrapib – a drug developed to combat heart disease – had in 
fact increased the risk of death and heart problems. Having already invested US$800 million in 
the development of this cholesteryl ester transfer protein (CETP), Pfizer was on the cusp of 
producing one of the best-selling drugs in history, with expected annual sales of around US$20 
billion. When the adverse discovery was made, Pfizer rapidly stopped development of torcetrapib 
and immediately suffered a series of drops in its share price (FiercePharma, 2010). The failure of 
torcetrapib, which had been expected to replace Pfizer’s top seller at the time, Lipitor, came as a 
major shock for the pharmaceutical giant. The event also had an instantaneous effect on other 
pharmaceutical companies with similar CETP projects in development. Several companies, such 
as AstraZeneca, followed Pfizer and withdrew their CETP projects. Others, such as Roche and 
Merck, reacted to Pfizer’s failure by improving their own CETP programs. Merck, for example, 
set about understanding basic CETP biology and slowed down its development plans. Even 
months after Pfizer’s failure, the positive effects could be seen in Merck’s own recently developed 
drug, which showed no increase in blood pressure (Economist, 2006). For Pfizer, the failure was 
not able to benefit other drugs in its development pipeline, since it did not have any other CETP 
developments planned. Instead, the company attempted to regroup by taking drastic cost-cutting 
measures and through the strategic acquisition of smaller firms. 
In industries with high levels of uncertainty, such as the biotech industry, more often than 
not managers must face situations similar to that of torcetrapib. In fact, research shows that, in the 
biotech industry, 85% of all projects entering phase I development fail (Hay, Thomas, Craighead, 
Economides, & Rosenthal, 2014). New product development (NPD) failure is also widespread in 
other industries, with rates never dropping below 35% (Castellion & Markham, 2013). With such 
high rates of NPD failure, and the threat they represent for a firm’s survival, understanding the 
impact they have on future NPDs has become a central issue for both practitioners (Barczak, 2014; 
Collins, 2015) and scholars (Hu, McNamara, & Piaskowska, 2016; Markovitch, Steckel, Michaut, 
Philip, & Tracy, 2015; Shepherd, Haynie, & Patzelt, 2013). 
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Scholars have long held the belief that organizations primarily adapt their behavior from a 
problemistic search arising from the experience of failure (Cyert & March, 1963; Madsen & Desai, 
2010; March & Shapira, 1992). According to the attention-based view (ABV), this is due to the 
fact that firms’ decision-makers are more likely to be aspiration-oriented (Greve, 2003). As such, 
low performance events, including failures, attract a firm’s attention, which in turn leads to a 
search for new knowledge (Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012). Some scholars argue that 
we cannot fully understand the implications of failure for the organization without first studying 
failure in conjunction with success (KC, Staats, & Gino, 2013; Madsen & Desai, 2010). On the 
one hand, a number of studies have found evidence that failure attracts more attention than success 
and is therefore more beneficial for the performance of organizations (Cannon & Edmondson, 
2001; Madsen & Desai, 2010). On the other hand, some have found that extracting value from 
failure is not always straightforward and, under certain circumstances, non-problemistic searches 
arising from success can even lead to improved performance (Deichmann & Ende, 2013). Given 
these contradictory findings, generalizing whether organizations benefit more from failure than 
from success, or vice versa, is not possible without more research dedicated to the topic (Madsen 
& Desai, 2010). 
As Figure 1 shows, the purpose of this research is to address the aforementioned gap by 
looking at the different effects that failure and success have on NPD performance. Consequently, 
we also answer practitioners’ calls for more research into the role of failure in NPD (Barczak, 
2014) and extend our understanding of the impact that failure and success have on the performance 
of future projects in two related directions. First, our study expands our insight into the ways that 
failure experience affects future NPD performance by showing that it is also important to 
differentiate among different salience of failure. Based on this, our study shows that the salience 
of failure, be it early-stage (phase I), medium-stage (phase II) or late-stage (phase III) in our 
context of clinical trials, affects decision-makers’ attention differently and is therefore relevant for 
understanding its performance. Second, we attempt to determine whether a firm’s performance is 
affected differently depending on whether the decision-maker gives more attention to failure or 
success. (Madsen & Desai, 2010). Third, as the torcetrapib example shows, organizations pay 
attention and can also benefit from the NPD experiences of others (Srinivasan, Haunschild, & 
Grewal, 2007; Talay, Calantone, & Voorhees, 2014). Observing others’ failures and successes is 
crucial for NPD, as organizations have limited resources and time to experiment with all possible 
outcomes in order to increase their likelihood of success. Therefore, we look at whether others’ 
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experiences of failure and success have greater impact on future performance than first-hand 
experience of failure and success.  
In order to extend our understanding of the impacts that failure and success have on future 
project performance, we take NPD in the biotech industry as the context for our research. In this 
industry, NPD failure can clearly be differentiated into three types of salience according to the 
stage of development at which they take place (phase I, II and III), which allows additional 
contributions to be made to the literature by answering calls for more research on the role of 
different salience of failure and success experiences (Gong, Zhang, & Xia, 2017). Similar to other 
studies in the related field, we employ a logit model to explore the impact that failure and success 
experiences have on the probability of future failure (Madsen & Desai, 2010) 
------ INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ------- 
Theory And Hypotheses 
 
According to the ABV of the firm (Ocasio, 1997), firms’ behavior – and, by extension, 
their performance – depends on what their decision-makers pay attention to. The ABV of the 
firm adopts Herbert Simon’s (1947) idea that decision-makers’ cognition is limited, meaning 
they cannot attend to all the stimuli available to them. Given the large amount of information 
available in a firm’s environment and the limits of human cognition, decision-makers must be 
selective in what they attend to at any one time. The ABV of the firm starts from this assumption 
of human nature and suggests that firms’ decision-makers make decisions using only those 
experiences that attract their attention.  
 
A major tenet in the ABV of the firm is that individual decision-maker’s attention is 
situated in the context of the firm’s activities and procedures. Firms are history-dependent systems 
and, as such, a firm’s experience acts as the basis for the way in which its environment is 
represented (Daft and Weick, 1984). Consequently, a firm’s history affects what its decision-
makers pay attention to, what they do, and thus the future performance of their NPDs (Garzón-
Vico, Gibbons, McNamara, & Rosier, 2016; Kraaijenbrink, 2012; Paladino, 2007; Wei, Yi, & 
Guo, 2014). A firm’s experience can affect its performance by directing decision-makers’ attention 
in various ways. For example, a firm’s experience can result in decision-makers discriminating 
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against irrelevant external information; a process that has the potential to lead to a reduction in 
project uncertainty (Olivera & Argote, 1999) or improve a firm’s problem-solving capabilities 
(Grant, 1996; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982). By directing decision-makers’ 
attention, a firm’s experience can also facilitate their ability to recognize, assimilate, and exploit 
new external knowledge (March, 1991) or direct them to the right partners more efficiently (Mayer 
& Salomon, 2006). 
But not all experiences have the same impact on firms’ attention and performance (Argote 
& Miron-Spektor, 2011; Darr & Argote, 1995; Ingram & Baum, 1997), and this is because 
different types of experiences have different salience and may not attract decision-makers’ 
attention to the same extent. The salience of an experience is crucial to understanding whether 
decision-makers will act upon it, as more salient experiences are more likely to attract attention 
and therefore play a bigger role in a firm’s behavior (Gavetti et al., 2012).  
 
A paramount example of salience is failure and success experiences, which largely derive 
from the fact that decision-makers’ attention is performance-oriented: decision-makers are more 
likely to focus on outcomes relevant to the firm’s performance (Greve, 2003). This is why failures 
such as torcetrapib attract a great deal of attention and determine the firm’s subsequent decisions; 
they suppose a major setback to the performance of the firm in question. It therefore comes as no 
surprise that numerous scholars have attempted to understand the roles of failure and success in 
firms’ performances in the past (e.g. Baum & Ingram, 1998; Deichmann & Ende, 2013; Desai, 
2014a; Desai, 2014b; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; KC et al., 2013; Kim & Miner, 2007; Madsen 
& Desai, 2010; Meschi & Métais, 2015; Shepherd, Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011; Su & McNamara, 
2012).  
 
Failure Experience 
 
NPD failure occurs when initial aspirations regarding the potential of a project are not 
met by the outcome (Cyert & March, 1963; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Shepherd & Cardon, 2009a; 
Shepherd, Patzelt, Williams, & Warnecke, 2014). As a result, firms direct their attention to the 
failure, and initiate a process of reflection and action with the intention of bringing outcomes and 
aspirations in line for better performance (Argyris & Schon, 1996). In order to do achieve this, 
firms’ decision-makers analyze failures to find information that might indicate problems with 
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current NPD projects (Hu et al., 2016) and ultimately help them predict future risks (Miner, Kim, 
Holzinger, & Haunschild, 1999). Based on this notion, many successful firms admit that part of 
their success is due to their readiness to react to failures (Gardiner, 2008). This view of how 
firms react to failures lines up well with Pfizer’s actions after torcetrapib’s failure. Pfizer 
investigated the reasons behind the failure, with the intention of predicting possible risks in other 
existing drug-development projects in its pipeline. This process concluded with different 
performance-relevant actions, including the termination of other existing projects currently in 
earlier development stages.  
Failure experience can also negatively affect a decision-maker’s ability to gather the 
correct information due to the emotions they cause (Disterer, 2002). Not meeting aspirations 
regarding a project can trigger and stir negative emotions in organizations (Huy, 2002; Kiefer, 
2005; Shepherd et al., 2011), which can in turn lead members of the firm to overestimate the 
possibility of new failures (Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996), become more inclined to leave 
the organization (Shepherd et al., 2013), or neglect to analyze the failure (Kiefer, 2005). The 
importance of emotions lies in the fact they might lead to firm members focusing their attention 
on explaining the failure away (KC et al., 2013) or determining accountability (Sitkin & Weingart, 
1995). If this occurs, it is likely that time is diverted away from understanding the event itself. 
Additionally, after a failure, organizations’ members might be less inclined to disclose all the 
relevant information surrounding the failure due to fears of retribution (Mantere, Aula, Schildt, & 
Vaara, 2013; Shepherd & Cardon, 2009b).  
 
Failure Experience Salience 
 
Although decision-makers in a firm tend to pay attention to, be affected by, and act following 
failures, not all failures attract the same level of attention or are directed in the same manner. 
Therefore, we assume that different failure experiences with variations in salience affect firm 
performance differently. Some scholars argue that failures have different salience based on the 
cost they represent for the firm and the degree of their rarity, meaning decision-makers’ behavior 
and the future firm’s performance are affected differently (Gong et al., 2017; Hayward, 2002; 
Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 2009; Madsen & Desai, 2010). In this respect, the ABV of the firm 
posits that differences in cost and rarity affect the level of attention that failure experiences receive 
and, consequently, the impact they will have on future organizational actions (Ocasio, 1997). In 
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particular, the more costly and rarer an experience is, the greater attention it will receive, and the 
greater its impact on future performance will be (Lampel et al., 2009).  
 
In the context of the biotech industry, the salience of a failure, and therefore the attention it 
receives, depends on the stage of development at which it takes place, since failures at different 
stages of development carry different cost implications for the firm and are different in how rare 
they are. As a result, drug-development projects increase their salience, and cost, as they progress 
through phases I, II and III. According to the latest estimates, out-of-pocket costs are US$25.3 
million for phase I, US$58.6 million for phase II, and US$255.4 million for phase III (DiMasi, 
Grabowski, & Hansen, 2016). These estimates, together with the cost of preclinical research, can 
bring the total investment needed for a compound to reach phase III up to US$2 billion; an amount 
more difficult to ignore than the smaller loses at phases I and II. Similarly, failures are rarer at 
phase III than at phases I and II. According to our data, only 14% of all drugs that enter 
development fail at phase III, while 38% fail in phase I and 32% do so in phase II. Therefore, 
failures that take place at phase III of development, such as torcetrapib, gain more attention from 
managers, shareholders, and the public than failures at phase I or II of development due to the 
higher cost implications and the increased rarity. Furthermore, failures at phase III are more 
salient, difficult to ignore by organizations, and are more likely to affect future decisions made on 
ongoing and possible new projects.  
 
As we have already argued, failures have the potential to not only affect firm’s performance 
in a positive sense by attracting the attention of decision-makers and directing future actions, they 
also can affect performance negatively through bad emotions (Huy, 2002; Kiefer, 2005; Shepherd 
et al., 2013; Shepherd et al., 2011) and accountability (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). It is then natural 
to assume that the negative impact on performance of negative emotions would increase with the 
cost implications of the failure, i.e., Phase III failures are more likely to lead to overstating the 
likelihood of future failure or make it less likely for a firm’s members to disclose relevant 
information regarding the failure than if this occurred during Phases II or I.  
 
Even though we acknowledge accountability and negative emotions as powerful factors 
affecting how organizations react to failure, we find stronger evidence in the literature to suggest 
that organizations benefit more from rarer failures with greater cost impact on the firm. Firms are 
more likely to allocate time and resources to explore the more significant failures among them 
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(Kim, Kim, & Miner, 2009; Madsen & Desai, 2010). Also, some organizations may turn less 
salient failures into successes if they do not have major negative consequences (Sitkin & Pablo, 
1992). Similarly, firms may find it easier to ignore failures with less significant cost implications 
due to the consequences and salience of the latter (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008). Following the above 
discussion, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. First-hand experience of late-stage NPD failure is more likely to reduce future 
failure than first-hand experience of early- and medium-stage NPD failure. 
 
Success Versus Failure Experience 
 
According to the ABV of the firm, failure and success experiences affect the attention of 
decision-makers differently. This is because, contrary to what happens with experience of failure, 
experience of success can be seen as evidence that organizational knowledge is adequate and that 
further knowledge development is not necessary (Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992; March & Shapira, 
1992). Although success experience does not lead firms to stop seeking new knowledge, it can 
lead to excessive trust in existing knowledge (Gino & Pisano, 2011; Louis & Sutton, 1991) and 
inertia (Miller, 1994), in addition to directing a firm’s attention towards a “local search” for 
knowledge – a process that is unchallenged (Lant et al., 1992) – and away from a “non-local 
search” (Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal & March, 1981). In certain industries, directing your 
attention towards a local search is not necessarily bad for a firm’s performance, as local searches 
can facilitate the refinement of successful routines and lead to better performance (Muehlfeld, Rao 
Sahib, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2012). But in contexts such as the biotech industry, where firms’ 
performances relies on innovation, local searches might not be enough to guarantee an acceptable 
performance level; decision-makers might be tempted to deviate their attention from relevant non-
local information (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004) and make 
flawed inputs (Markovitch et al., 2015), resulting in poor decision-making approaches and an 
ultimately poorer performance (Audia & Goncalo, 2007). We find an example of the possible 
negative impacts of success experiences in a study of the hard-disk drive industry by Audia and 
Goncalo (2007), in which they discovered that greater success experience led to fewer innovative 
ideas from employees, who preferred to rely on familiar knowledge instead.  
 9 
The idea that experience of success might be less beneficial to future performance than 
experience of failure in highly innovative industries is supported by Madsen and Desai (2010), 
who carried out the only direct comparison of these two experiences at the organizational level. 
Their study focused on the global orbital launch vehicle industry, where success is more common 
than failure. Their findings support the idea that organizations pay more attention to and benefit 
more from prior failure than from prior success, resulting in a decrease in the probability of future 
failure. They argue that failure leads to improvements in performance because it directs an 
organization’s attention towards the search for new knowledge; a process that success, as 
previously argued, does not necessarily do.  
We also find strong evidence in the psychology literature that failures are more likely to 
attract attention than successes. Studies looking at how individuals react to either a loss or a gain 
show that, when compared, the former looms larger and has greater salience, and is thus more 
likely to condition the attention and future decisions of the individual (Kahneman & Tversky, 
2013). This asymmetry between losses and gains has an evolutionary explanation: you are more 
likely to survive if you treat threats as more urgent (Kahneman, 2011). Therefore, and following 
the above discussion, we assume that decision-makers will pay more attention to failures than 
successes in the biotech industry due to the negative implications that such failures have for the 
firm’s survival. As we have already argued, phase III failures in the biotech industry are more 
likely to attract attention and affect performance than phase I and II failures; as such, we only 
make a comparison between failure experiences and success experiences found in phase III 
developments.  
 
Hypothesis 2. First-hand experience of late-stage NPD failure is more likely to reduce future 
failure than first-hand experience of NPD success. 
 
First-hand Versus Others’ Experience of Failure and Success 
Torcetrapib’s failure and the consequences it had for other firms represents an example of 
how organizations can benefit vicariously from others’ related failure experiences (e.g. Beckman 
& Haunschild, 2002; Bresman, 2013; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Ingram & Baum, 1997; Miner 
& Haunschild, 1995; Yang, Li, & Delios, 2015). Research in this area suggests that the likelihood 
of organizational failure decreases when the number of other organizations experiencing failures 
increases. This indicates that organizations pay attention to failure when it takes place in their own 
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environment, as doing so has the potential to reveal the presence of possible future failures in their 
own organizations (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Ingram & Baum, 1997; 
Kim & Miner, 2007). In some industries, the information regarding a failure is made available to 
the public, making it more likely to attract the attention and condition the behavior of other firms. 
The orbital launch vehicle industry is an example whereby the disclosure of information following 
a failure seems to explain why other organizations might benefit from the experience of others 
(Madsen & Desai, 2010). Similarly, in the biotech industry, organizations are obliged by law to 
disclose designs and the results of all clinical studies for treatments within a given period, which 
in turn facilitates the ability of other firms to inform their decisions from observing others’ failures 
Despite there being plenty of evidence to suggest that organizations do pay attention to, 
and benefit from, the experiences of others (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; 
Ingram & Baum, 1997; Kim & Miner, 2007; Scarbrough, Robertson, & Swan, 2015), it is not yet 
clear in the literature whether organizations benefit more from their own failures or more from 
others’. We propose that organizations benefit more from observing others’ failures than from 
their own because, as previously argued, the experience of failing can affect their ability to extract 
relevant lessons from the experience. Furthermore, the observing firm will not be affected by all 
the financial and emotional implications of the failure, which, as previously mentioned, can affect 
the performance of the organization. 
Pfizer’s failure exemplifies the situation described above. The fact it was Pfizer involved in 
the failure created a sense of panic, as the firm’s current market leader was set to expire five years 
down the line. Most of the efforts after the failure were concentrated on developing drastic 
measures that could prevent an immediate catastrophe. One such measure was the immediate task 
of cutting 10,000 jobs. During the time in which Pfizer was concentrating on these measures, other 
competitors could sit back and begin the process of analyzing torcetrapib’s failure. This explains 
why, contrary to what happened to Pfizer, the outlook for companies such as AstraZeneca, Roche, 
and Merck improved at the news of the termination of torcetrapib’s development. As argued above, 
the fact that these firms were not directly involved in the failure gave them the financial and 
emotional security needed to make better decisions. 
Additionally, the fact that AstraZeneca, Merck, and Roche had similar projects to 
torcetrapib in their pipelines allowed them to review and evaluate the consequences of the 
torcetrapib failure for their own projects, which were still in the early stages of development. This 
is in line with findings in the literature that support the idea that organizations pay more attention 
and benefit more from others’ experiences if they are related to their own past and present 
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experience (Bresman, 2013; Nesta & Saviotti, 2005). Additionally, when an organization is 
familiar with the experience of another company, it will be more likely to employ and use this 
known experience more appropriately, without having to translate it to an unrelated context (Hora 
& Klassen, 2013; Ingram & Baum, 1997). Based on the above discussion, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Others’ related experience of late-stage NPD failure is more likely to reduce future 
NPD failure than first-hand experience of late-stage NPD failure. 
 
Organizations not only pay attention to and make decisions based on others’ failures, they 
also closely follow and benefit from others’ successes (Madsen & Desai, 2010). In a context of 
shared knowledge bases, observing others’ success might prompt an organization to copy the 
practices of the succeeding organization (Carroll & Hannan, 1995; Miner et al., 1999). This is why 
firms that operate in a common domain typically employ similar practices. In the biotech industry, 
it is common that an initial success in combating a certain illness prompts other competitors to 
adopt similar approaches.  
 
We previously argued that first-hand success experience can be self-limiting and affect 
performance negatively, often resulting in firms implementing a local search and becoming 
overconfident (Audia et al., 2000; Hayward et al., 2004). This is not the case when a firm observes 
others’ successes. It is, in fact, the contrary: watching others’ successes might create a sense of 
urgency in the observing firm, pushing it to imitate as a way of replicating a similar successful 
outcome and maintain a competitive advantage (Posen, Lee, & Yi, 2013). Following the above 
discussion, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4. Others’ related experience of NPD success is more likely to reduce future failure 
than first-hand experience of NPD success. 
 
Methodology 
Research Setting 
The biotech industry offers fertile ground through which to answer our research question. 
Efficiently responding to new advances and developments is crucial, since companies face 
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tremendous pressure to innovate. In the last 10 years, the number of drugs in development has 
increased by 62%, whilst research and development (R&D) expenditure has doubled. Although 
the number of new medicines reaching the market picked up in 2015, annual output has effectively 
flatlined over the same period; developing new medicines is becoming an increasingly expensive 
business (the average cost per molecule is anything from US$75 million to US$4 billion), and the 
regulatory context of drug development is also becoming more rigorous (e.g., the Food and Drug 
Administration is building an active surveillance system called Sentinel to oversee the safety of 
all medicines on the US market). Virtually all firms in the biotech industry have multiple product 
candidates in their development pipelines. Given the low probability of a product reaching the 
market, ranging between 10% and 15% (Hay et al., 2014), a critical factor for managers is to 
allocate R&D resources wisely. In this context, maximizing the use of first-hand and others’ 
experiences for drug development is of vital importance in the biotech industry, as doing so 
informs decisions regarding costly project development. 
Sample and Data 
We obtained the data with which to conduct our research from Pharma Projects, a database 
containing information on pharmaceutical and biotech drug-development projects. The source data 
are based on company questionnaires, and the filings, journals, annual reports, industry 
conferences, and press releases of the US Securities and Exchange Commission and US Food and 
Drug Administration. Pharma Projects includes data from more than 600 biotech and 
biopharmaceutical companies, with detailed profiles showing joint ventures, licensing agreements, 
and over 29,000 detailed drug profiles, including 217 therapy profiles. The information in the 
database is regularly updated and includes all historical information on every compound ever 
recorded. 
We focused our search only on those drugs that had a biological origin; these included 
biological cells, cellular structural components, and macromolecules (including DNA/RNA, 
peptides, proteins, and structural polysaccharides/lipids) from natural sources. Like similar studies 
that use data on drug development for their analysis, we believe that focusing on biologic drugs 
(large molecules) ensures homogeneous sampling and controls for variance that exists within the 
broader group of pharma/biotech/life sciences products (e.g. Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005, 2010). 
We focused only on drugs that were either fully launched or ceased between January 2000 and 
March 2015, and that had entered clinical trials. It is only when drugs enter clinical trials involving 
humans that information on failures becomes widely available. Also, it is only when humans are 
involved in trials that failures have a significant impact on firms, both financially and socially. 
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For all projects, an event date (either for full launch or cessation) was identified. This 
resulted in a total sample of 1,749 drugs, of which 264 (15.09%) were fully launched, and 1,485 
(84.91%) were ceased during the 15-year period. A total of 904 organizations participated in the 
development of the 1,749 drugs as either originators or licensees. Because we wanted to explore 
the impact of failure and success experiences on future performance and because, in some cases, 
more than one organization was involved in the development of one drug, we organized our data 
as unbalanced panel data. We ended up with a total of 2,981 observations for all 904 organizations 
and 1,749 drugs. Some of the organizations in our sample only took part in a very small number 
of drug-development projects and were subsequently left out of our fixed-effects analysis. Fixed-
effects analysis controls for firm heterogeneity and, as such, does not consider those firms with all 
drug-development projects as either failures or successes. This subsample, which contained a total 
of 1,145 observations developed by a total of 79 organizations, was employed to build our model. 
Nonetheless, we used the full 2,981 observations to construct our variables for others’ 
organizational experiences. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable represents whether a given drug-development project has been 
fully launched or ceased. All the projects are either clear launches or ceased projects. In the biotech 
industry, it is widely assumed that drugs that are fully launched are those that have reached the 
market and have therefore completed all clinical trials successfully and passed the necessary 
regulatory approvals. We define ‘ceased’ as those drug-development projects that have been 
stopped before reaching the market. A drug-development project can either be ceased after phase 
I, II, or III trials, or at the time of assessment by the regulatory agency. Each phase of development 
involves a larger number of patients and greater overall costs. In our sample, the reasons for 
ceasing a project are always scientific, meaning that the results of the clinical trials did not prove 
the efficacy of the drug in question. Thus, ceased is a dichotomous dummy variable, coded 1 for 
ceased projects and 0 for fully launched. 
 
Independent Variables 
The variable measuring first-hand early-stage failure experience represents the number of 
failed projects at phase I of development in which an organization was involved as either an 
originator or a licensee. The variable measuring first-hand medium-stage failure experience 
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represents the number of failed projects at phase II of development in which an organization was 
involved as either an originator or a licensee. The variable measuring first-hand late-stage failure 
experience represents the number of failed projects at phase III of development in which an 
organization was involved as either an originator or a licensee. The first-hand success experience 
variable is the number of successful prior projects in which an organization was involved as either 
an originator or a licensee. The variable measuring others’ related success experience is the 
number of fully launched projects in the same therapeutic area as the project in question by other 
organizations. The variable measuring others’ related late-stage failure experience is the number 
of projects ceased in phase III in the same therapeutic area as the project in question by other 
organizations. 
 During the time covered by the sample, several organizations in our sample merged with 
others or were acquired by others. In these cases, the above experience variables were constructed 
so as to account for all the prior experience possessed by the merged or acquired organization. 
Experience Discount Factor 
Some researchers suggests that the value of experience depreciates over time (Kim & 
Miner, 2007; Olivera & Argote, 1999). Extracting value from distant experience can lead 
organizations to adopt routines that worked well in the past but that are no longer useful (Levinthal 
and March, 1993). Because there is often no theoretical basis for a specific functional form of the 
depreciation of experience, previous researchers have often used a pre-specified model of 
experience devaluation (Darr & Argote, 1995; Ingram & Baum, 1997; Kim & Miner, 2007; 
Madsen & Desai, 2010). In order to account for the depreciation of past experience over time and 
as a robustness test, we employed a series of arbitrarily selected discount factors by which prior 
experiences are divided before being added into a cumulative past experience variable. First, we 
used a discount factor equal to 1, assuming no depreciation in the value of past experience. Second, 
we set the depreciation factor to the square root of the age of the experience, assuming that 
experience initially depreciates more slowly than linearly and slows further with time. Third, we 
used a discount factor equal to the age of the experience, assuming that experience depreciates in 
linear fashion. Fourth, we set the discount factor equal to the experience age squared, assuming 
that the value of past experience depreciates faster than linearly at first and then accelerates further 
with time. We employed the discount that yielded a better fit for the model. 
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Control Variables 
Based on prior research in drug-development projects, which shows that the scientific 
characteristics of the drugs may affect the outcome of the project (Danzon, Nicholson, & Pereira, 
2005; Macher & Boerner, 2006), we created various variables covering scientific aspects of the 
drug-development projects. therapeutic area risk measures the percentage of prior failed projects 
within the therapeutic area of the focal drug at the time of the event. Similarly, the variable 
biological origin risk measures the percentage of prior failed drug-development projects within 
the biological origin group of the focal drug at the time of the event. Both of these variables control 
for the difference of scientific complexity behind each drug-development project. We also 
controlled for whether the drug-development project targeted a rare disease. Rare diseases are less 
likely to be the subject of scientific research, i.e., there may be less interest, resources, and political 
drive behind their development. We employed a dummy variable (rare disease) with 1 indicating 
those drugs listed as rare diseases by the Genetic and Rare Diseases Association. 
Whether a project is conducted solo or in collaboration with other firms can affect support 
for a project. We created a dummy variable (R&D alliance), where 0 denotes a solo project and 1 
denotes a project conducted in collaboration with another firm. As a way to control for 
unobservable year effects, such as the introduction of new technologies in drug development, and 
for correct truncation, the variable year indicates the year in which the project was initiated. We 
also controlled for the organization’s size, as this may affect its ability to extract value from both 
failure and success. Following several prior studies that have used R&D expenditure as a proxy to 
an organization’s size (e.g. Lee & Chen, 2009), we created the variable R&D investment, which 
measures the total amount invested in the years prior to the date of observation. We also controlled 
for the role that the organization plays in the development of the drug in question. The dummy 
variable organization’s role is coded 1 for companies that are the originator of the compound and 
0 for companies that act as licensees. The experience and expertise an organization has in terms 
of its drug-development project is relevant to its future performance (Macher & Boerner, 2012). 
By employing the number of previous drugs developed by the same organization in that particular 
therapeutic area, we thus created the variable therapeutic area experience to capture the level of 
expertise held by the organization. We also measured the percentage of total failed projects per 
organization (percentage failed) to control for the relationship between failed and successful 
projects. 
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In addition, we employed Heckman’s selection model to control for the endogeneity of 
strategic decisions. The decision regarding the future of projects can be determined by unobserved 
factors that are not available or reflected in the model, so not controlling for them could result in 
misleading results (Argyres & Liebeskind, 2002). We employed Heckman’s first-stage model to 
create a selection term that controls for endogeneity in the second-stage analysis (Heckman, 1979). 
Heckman’s first-stage model consists of a multinominal logit model that estimates the probability 
of a firm choosing to either terminate or keep a project in development. In this model, we included 
the independent and control variables. This first-stage model returned an adjustment term – an 
inverse Mills ratio – which was then included in the later model. 
 
Analysis 
Similar to previous studies on failure experience (e. g. Madsen & Desai, 2010), we used 
logistic regression analysis to model the likelihood that a drug-development project resulted in 
failure. This is common for binary-response models, such as ours, where the dependent variable 
has only two possible values. We included firm-specific fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity (Hosmer Jr, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). The inclusion of organizations’ fixed 
effects was necessary because many characteristics of the firms were unobservable during the 
period of the study. The fixed-effects regression model takes the form: 
log( %&1 − %&
) = 	,- + /′-&1 + 2-& 
where Pj is the probability that drug-development project j will fail, and ,- is a firm-specific 
paramenter representing the effect of unobserved firm characteristics. 1 signifies regression 
coefficients representing the effects of the observed covariates, and 2-& independent error terms. 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables included in this 
study. The experience variables used in this study were depreciated using their best-fitting 
depreciation value. The different values are reported in brackets below each variable. There are 
some moderate correlations. The reason for the moderate correlation between R&D alliance and 
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organization’s role (r=0.67) is that all those organizations that were the solo developers of a drug 
(value of 1 for governance) were also the originators (value of 1 for organization’s role). There is 
also a moderate correlation between first-hand late-stage failure experience and R&D investment 
(r=0.66). We ran the analysis without the control variables for R&D alliance and R&D investment, 
and the results followed the same pattern. 
----- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ---- 
Table 2 reports maximum-likelihood estimates for the fixed-effects logit regression 
analysis of drug failures. Model 1 contains only control variables that can be used for comparison 
against the models containing experience variables. In Model 1, we see that the coefficient for 
calendar year is positive and significant, suggesting that since 2000, the likelihood of failure has 
increased. This finding is in line with recent studies in the industry showing that the likelihood of 
failure has increased over the last decade due to regulatory changes (Hay et al., 2014). We also 
find that, as the percentage of failed drug-development projects increases, the likelihood of future 
failure decreases. Our results also show that increasing the complexity of the science, both for the 
therapeutic area and biological origin, increases the likelihood of future failure. Furthermore, 
Model 1 also shows that more R&D investment reduces the likelihood of future failure. In 
particular, a marginal-effects analysis at mean values for all other variables shows that increasing 
R&D investment by US$1 billion would decrease the likelihood of failure by 11 percentage points. 
The statistical significance of the inverse Mills ratio indicates that unobserved characteristics 
underlying the decisions made by drug-development firms also influence the likelihood of future 
failure. 
------ INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ------ 
Models 2 to 6 look at the impact of first-hand early-stage failure experience, first-hand 
medium-stage failure experience, first-hand late-stage failure experience, and first-hand success 
experience on the likelihood of drug failure. Hypothesis 1 suggested that the probability of drug 
failure is lower with first-hand experience of late-stage failure than with first-hand experience of 
early- and medium-stage failure. In Model 4, the first-hand late-stage failure experience coefficient 
is negative and significant (p<.05), indicating that the probability of failure decreases as 
organizations gain experience of late-stage failure. We also conducted a marginal-effects analysis 
for first-hand late-stage failure experience and present the results in Figure 2. Increasing first-hand 
late-stage failure experience by one standard deviation, whilst keeping all other variables at mean 
values, decreases the probability of failure by 45 percentage points. In Models 2 and 3, the 
coefficients for first-hand early- and medium-stage failure experiences are positive and non-
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significant. These results remain stable when included together in Model 6. These results support 
Hypothesis 1 and indicate that first-hand late-stage failure experience is more likely to reduce 
future failure than first-hand experience of early- or medium-stage failure. 
------ INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ------ 
In Hypothesis 2, we suggested that the probability of drug failure is lower with first-hand 
experience of late-stage failure than with first-hand experience of success. In Model 5, we find 
that the first-hand success experience coefficient for the probability of failure rate is negative and 
significant (p<.001). This finding indicates that failures become less likely as organizations gain 
experience of success. To determine the net effect of first-hand success experience, we predicted 
probabilities of project failure against first-hand success experience, with all other variables 
calculated at their mean value. Figure 3 indicates that an organization’s first-hand success 
experience has a negative impact on the probability of future failure. In particular, our analysis 
shows that, keeping all other variables at mean values, increasing the first-hand success experience 
variable by one standard deviation reduces the probability of failure by 48 percentage points. 
Model 6 includes both first-hand experience variables. In Model 6, we see how the coefficients 
for first-hand experience of late-stage failure and success remain stable. A Wald test (p<.001) 
suggests that the first-hand success experience coefficient in Model 6 is significantly more 
negative than the coefficient for first-hand late-stage failure experience. This is consistent with the 
argument that success experience is more likely to reduce future failure than first-hand experience 
of late-stage failure. These findings do not support Hypothesis 2. 
------ INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ------ 
 
Hypothesis 3 suggested that the probability of drug failure is lower with others’ related 
experience of late-stage failure than with first-hand experience of late-stage failure. In Model 7, 
we can see that the impact of others’ related late-stage failure experience on the probability of 
future failure is positive and significant (p<.05). This indicates that the likelihood of future failure 
increases as the number of others’ related late-stage failure increases. In Model 8, others’ related 
late-stage failure experience and first-hand late-stage failure experience both remain unchanged. 
We also conducted marginal-effects analysis for others’ related late-stage failure experience and 
present them in Figure 4. Further analysis shows that increasing others’ related late-stage failure 
experience by one standard deviation, whilst keeping all other variables at mean values, increases 
the probability of failure by 37 percentage points. These results do not support Hypothesis 3, as 
the coefficient for first-hand late-stage failure experience is negative whilst the coefficient for 
others’ related late-stage failure experience is positive. 
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------ INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE ------ 
In Hypothesis 4, we anticipated that others’ related experience of success reduces the 
likelihood of failure more than first-hand experience of success. In Model 9, we can see how 
others’ related success experience is negative and significant (p<.001). This value remains 
negative although it loses some significance (p<.01) when the others’ related success experience 
variable is included with first-hand success experience in Model 10. We can also appreciate how 
first-hand success experience becomes non-significant, even though it remains negative, when 
combined with others’ related success experience in Model 8. These results support Hypothesis 4 
and suggest that others’ related success experience is more likely to reduce future failure than first-
hand success experience. We also conducted a marginal-effects analysis for others’ related success 
experience and present the results in Figure 5. Increasing others’ related success experience by 
one standard deviation, whilst keeping all other variables at mean values, decreases the probability 
of failure by 55 percentage points. 
------ INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE ------ 
Robustness Tests 
 
In addition to the main analyses reported above, we conducted supplementary analyses to 
assess whether our results were robust. First, whilst the use of fixed-effects models is consistent 
with previous studies on failure (Madsen & Desai, 2010), there are other ways to model our data. 
Specifically, we used a probit random-effects specification to address the non-independence of 
observations within organizations (Wry, Lounsbury, & Jenni, 2014). A random-effects 
specification divides the residual of each observation into organization-specific and other 
components to allow for organization-level changes through time. The advantage of random-
effects modeling is that it looks at the increase in the odds of failure averaged over all the 
organizations in the population and not just in the increase in the odds of failure in the organization 
the drug belongs to. Because the focus in random-effects modeling is the whole population, these 
analyses included firms that had only successes or failures and that were left out of the fixed-
effects analysis. We used the ‘xtprobit’ command in STATA 12, and present the results in Table 
3. The pattern of results was similar to the fixed-effects model with no changes in the signs of the 
experience variables. 
We also conducted analyses using a theoretical rationale based on our interactions with 
practitioners in the industry. We assumed that phase I failure experiences, due to their smaller cost 
implications, depreciate the fastest; therefore, we used the square of their ages. For phase II failure 
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experiences, we used an age discount to represent a slower depreciation of knowledge to that of 
phase I failure experiences. Lastly, we assumed that, due to the magnitude involved, both first-
hand and others’ phase III failure experiences would depreciate even more slowly than those 
experiences of phase II. Therefore, we employed a depreciation factor of the square root of their 
ages. The results yielded the same support to our hypotheses as the main models. We also followed 
other prior studies when using the same discount factor for different types and employed the age 
of the experience as a discount (Kim et al., 2009; Meschi & Métais, 2013). The direction of the 
predictions was the same as those in the main analysis. 
One of the concerns when developing the ideas in this study was whether the explanatory 
variables employed added extra explanatory power. One of the aims of the research presented here 
was to suggest that breaking down first-hand total failure experience into early-, medium-, and 
late-stage phases is of interest when explaining drug failure. In order to test whether early-, 
medium-, and late-stage failure experience added any value to the analysis, we reanalyzed the data 
with a total first-hand failure experience. The resulting model was significant, but the models that 
disaggregated total failure experience into first-hand early-stage, medium-stage, and late-stage 
failure experience yielded a better fit.  
 
Discussion  
We examined whether experiences of NPD failure and success shape the outcome of a 
firm’s subsequent NPD. In particular, we looked at failure experiences with different salience, 
focusing on whether they took place within or outside the firm. Using the ABV of the firm, we 
considered different mechanisms to explain whether a type of experience – failure or success – is 
more likely to attract the attention of decision-makers, and whether this affects the performance 
of future NPD. Our work contributes to the ABV-of-the-firm literature in several ways. 
First, this study complements the ABV of the firm by being the first to show that NPD 
failures attract the attention of decision-makers differently, depending on the stage of development 
at which they take place. In particular, our work shows that failure attracts firms’ attention and 
improves performance only if the failure is substantially salient in terms of its financial 
implications and rarity. We argued that when a failure has major financial consequences and is 
rare, it will get more organizational attention and, therefore, be more likely to affect decisions 
regarding ongoing and future NPD. This goes some way in explaining our findings. Early and 
medium failures in the biotech industry have considerably smaller financial consequences and are 
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more frequent than late-stage failures. Indeed, our results are consistent with the notion that 
organizations are less likely to benefit from failures that are not rare and/or have no major financial 
consequences relative to others’ failure events. We do not argue that the financial consequences 
of small- and medium-stage failures in the biotech industry are not considerable, only that in 
situations in which organizational attention is limited, it will be those rarer events with greater 
impact that become managers’ primary focus of attention. Our findings extend the idea that more 
salient failures are more difficult to ignore by firms and are, consequently, more likely to affect 
any future decisions made (Madsen & Desai, 2010).  
Second, our findings run counter to theories suggesting that accountability and negative 
emotions after salient failures negatively affect future performance. For example, our results are 
at odds with the small-losses hypothesis in the ABV-of-the-firm literature, which argues that, after 
salient failures, organizations are more prone to dedicating a greater deal of their attention to 
determining accountability, rather than understanding the event and improving future performance 
(Gong et al., 2017; Hayward, 2002). On the contrary, our results suggest that, in the biotech 
industry, firms dedicating some of their attention to accountability are still able to pay attention to 
understanding the event. Similarly, our findings are also at odds with studies claiming that more 
salient failures are associated with greater negative emotions, and thus lead to a decrease in future 
performance (Mantere, Aula, Schildt, & Vaara, 2013; Shepherd & Cardon, 2009b). One reason 
that might explain why late-stage failure experience does not lead to accountability and/or 
emotions affecting the performance of future NPD is that, in the biotech industry, there exists a 
stronger normalization of failure, which might reduce the need to blame others, and see a reduced 
intensity of negative effects (Shepherd et al., 2011). We do not interpret this finding as evidence 
that negative emotions or accountability do not play a role in future actions that might affect the 
future of forthcoming NPD, but it does suggest that the salience of late-stage failures plays a bigger 
role in pushing the firm towards scrutinizing and extracting information relevant to the event in 
question. 
Third, our results challenge the ABV-of-the-firm assumption that organizations pay more 
attention to, and benefit more from, knowledge searches sparked by prior failure (Cyert & March, 
1963; Lant et al., 1992; Madsen & Desai, 2010; March & Shapira, 1992). Contrary to our findings, 
Madsen and Desai (2010) show that failure attracts the attention of decision-makers and promotes 
improvement more so than success; however, their study is in the orbital launch vehicle industry, 
where successes are the norm. In the biotech industry, successes are rare, with only 15% of all 
drugs successfully reaching the market. This difference in the rate of success in both industries 
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might explain the fact that, in our study, success attracts more attention and leads to better 
performance. In fact, our findings support other prior studies claiming that rare successes are seen 
by managers as rich examples to follow and a way to excel during new projects (Deichmann & 
Ende, 2013; KC et al., 2013; Lampel et al., 2009). Furthermore, in the context of the biotech 
industry, successes not only indicate the success of a particular drug but also the success of a 
certain strategy to combat a disease. Therefore, in an industry in which successes are rare, an 
organization may be led to believe that their strategy –scanning the environment for new 
knowledge and translating it into a product – is adequate. We therefore posit that our results are 
more likely to be generalizable to other NPD industries that share similar rates of success, and to 
early-, medium-, and late-stage failures within the biotech industry. This is an important 
contribution because, as our results show, whether organizations decide to pay more attention to 
failure or to success depends on the characteristics of the industry. Comparing results across 
industries helps us draw some conclusions on the roles of failure and success experiences on NPD 
performance. 
Fourth, this work addresses other significant questions regarding the boundary conditions 
of failure and success experiences. In particular, our results show that an increase in others’ related 
late-stage failure experience results in an increase in the likelihood of future failure in the 
organization, which indicates that the attention that others’ related failures attracts does not lead 
to an improvement in performance. Our results are in contrast to certain scholastic claims that 
others’ failures help improve the performance of other observing organizations (Baum & Dahlin, 
2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010). We interpret these findings as indicating that the related late-stage 
failures of others do in fact attract the attention of decision-makers, but not because they are 
interested in extracting information to improve the prospects of their own similar drug-
development projects. Rather, such decision-makers, particularly those in the biotech industry, are 
more interested in the efficacy of a certain strategy in combating a certain disease. In other words, 
a drug failure might push observing firms to examine the evidence surrounding their own similar 
projects; a process that often results in the project being terminated. An example is bapineuzumab, 
a drug to combat Alzheimer’s disease, that failed at phase III in 2012. This late-stage failure led 
to a sense of panic in observing firms with similar projects, resulting in many of them being 
terminated.  
Fifth, our study also finds builds on the ABV of the firm by expanding our knowledge in 
terms of the way that firms react to other’s related successes in the industry. In particular, this 
study supports the claim that others’ related success experience has a greater impact on future 
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performance than first-hand success experience. This results in other observing organizations 
directing their attention to the successful strategy with a view to replicating its success. Moreover, 
a proven strategy to combat a certain disease will probably count on increased backing by other 
observing organizations. Despite first-hand success experience having a positive impact on the 
performance of future drug developments, our results show that the impact of others’ related 
success experience is greater in terms of its influence. One possible reason for this might be that 
certain successes in the biotech industry has seen some decision-makers becoming overconfident 
(Gino & Pisano, 2011; Louis & Sutton, 1991). As argued previously, the financial implications of 
success might remove some of the urgency in looking for new innovative drugs, resulting in 
organizations becoming less inclined, or able, to reduce the probability of future failure. The fact 
that observing organizations do not reap the financial rewards from the success, and are 
consequently less susceptible to overconfidence, might explain how they benefit more from the 
experience.  
 
Implications for Practice 
The results of this study have several implications for practice. First, as highlighted by 
Madsen and Desai (2010), how organizations deal with failure explains inter-organizational 
variation in performance. These authors suggest that managers should acknowledge failures in 
order to recognize the central role they play in organizational performance. According to their 
findings, organizations’ leaders should not ignore failures; rather, they should treat them as 
invaluable opportunities. Our findings expand upon this assertion, suggesting that managers do 
not treat all types of failures equally; cost implications and rarity play a role in the level of attention 
they receive. In particular, our results indicate that, during the earlier stages of development, 
managers miss an opportunity by not paying enough attention to less salient failures, which have 
the potential to be quite valuable. As such, we believe that managers should increase their efforts 
to study less costly failures, since doing so might help their organizations from incurring a more 
expensive backlash further down the line. We do not suggest that paying more attention to less 
costly failures should be at the expense of those with higher cost; rather, managers should widen 
their scope, putting in place processes that allow failures with lesser consequences – which 
potentially contain important lessons for the future – to be scrutinized more carefully.  
Second, failure should still be acknowledged by organizations, but not at the expense of 
success experience. As our findings show, failure does not always have a greater impact on 
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organizational performance than success and, consequently, it should not always be primary focus 
of attention. Our results show that, in contexts like the biotech industry where success rates are 
low, success experience positively affects performance. As a result, we suggest that firms put in 
place systems that maximize the benefits obtained from successful events as a core element of best 
practice. This is especially important in industries where successes are more frequent and therefore 
more likely to attract less attention. Processes to analyze success experience should also go beyond 
the firm’s boundaries, as our findings indicate that firms observing success benefit even more than 
those experiencing it. 
Third, managers need to understand that others’ failures may indicate problems for their 
own similar projects. In the biotech industry, managers are well aware of the importance of other 
related failures, and most firms have well-established processes and protocols in place to scan and 
analyze related failure events in their environment. Every time a phase III failure takes place in 
the industry, firms start a process of analysis to try to understand the immediate consequences for 
their own related projects. Surprisingly, and despite managerial awareness of the importance of 
others’ similar failures, our results show that these efforts are not sufficient enough to improve 
firms’ performances. Therefore, we suggest that managers dedicate greater time to understanding 
the implications of others’ salient failures.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
Based on the limitations of this study, we can propose a number of recommendations for 
future research on the topic of failure and success experiences. First, we focused on a specific 
setting, in the form of a single industry: biotech. Single-industry samples, whilst allowing control 
for exogenous industry effects, limit generalizability. This is particularly important when the rarity 
and financial implications of successes and failures vary according to industry conditions. 
Therefore, it would be advisable to probe generalizability to other sectors, including the 
development of small-molecule drugs. Similarly, research in other NPD industries with similar 
rates of failure and success to our sample might also help unearth other nuances not present in our 
work.  
Second, considering prior work, we made several assumptions in order to explain the 
connection between experience and the probability of future failure. Some of these assumptions 
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exist at the micro level, whilst our analysis is conducted at the macro level. For example, we 
assume that failures and successes cause negative emotions that affect how decision-makers 
confront future decisions and, accordingly, future performance. This is an important limitation; 
we believe that future work should look into micro-level factors, such as emotions or decision-
making processes, and determine how these affect macro-level variables, such as the likelihood of 
future NPD failure. 
The third limitation arises from the fact that we use a limited understanding of related 
failure and success experiences. In particular, we employ therapeutic areas to determine whether 
two drug-development projects are related. Despite using very well-established criteria for our 
chosen industry, this does not exhaust other relevant ways in which two projects might be similar. 
Specifically, firms could extract relevant information from projects that are similar in biological 
origin, mode of action, or delivery, even though they might be different in a therapeutic sense. We 
suggest that other studies use alternative methods to understand the concepts of ‘related’ and 
‘unrelated’ to see if the findings hold. Changing the industry might also affect how the 
related/unrelated pair affects performance. 
Fourth, this study indicates that the mechanisms employed by firms to extract information 
from failures and successes are relevant and, in some cases, insufficient to improve organizational 
performance. Nonetheless, we do not examine how these processes might work. This limitation 
constitutes an important opportunity for future work. More research on the particular processes 
that organizations employ to analyze failure and success events is needed. This work could then 
shed light upon the particular deficiencies that currently exist in the ways that organizations deal 
with failure and success experiences. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Std. Dv. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Ceased 0.84 0.36 0.00 1.00 1.00     
2. R&D Alliance 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 -0.02 1.00    
3. Year 2008 4 2000 2015 0.00 -0.06** 1.00   
4. Organization’s Role 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.05* -0.67*** 0.05** 1.00  
5. Percentage Failed 55.32 44.05 0.00 100.00 0.20*** 0.08*** 0.04* -0.06** 1.00 
6. Therapeutic area experience 5.43 10.08 0.00 57.00 -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.00 0.06*** 0.13*** 
7. Rare Disease 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
8. Therapeutic Area Risk 81.19 24.93 0.00 100.00 0.41*** 0.07*** 0.03 -0.03 0.19*** 
9. Biological Origin Risk 84.14 16.02 0.00 100.00 0.29*** 0.04* -0.02 -0.00 0.05* 
10. R&D Investment (in million $) 1325 2331 0.43 9877.73 0.01 0.06** 0.08*** -0.09*** 0.33*** 
11. First-Hand Success Experience 
(Age Square Disc.) 
0.03 0.17 0.00 1.55 -0.34*** -0.04* 0.07*** 0.00 -0.14*** 
12. First-Hand Early-Stage Failure Experience 
(Age Disc.) 
0.04 0.17 0.00 2.28 0.07*** -0.06** 0.02 0.05** 0.18*** 
13. First-Hand Medium-Stage Failure Experience 
(Age Disc.) 
0.02 0.13 0.00 1.50 0.05** -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.15*** 
14. First-Hand Late-stage Failure Experience 
(No Disc.) 
2.35 4.35 0.00 21.00 0.03 -0.02 0.07*** -0.00 0.35*** 
15. Others’ Related Success Experience 
(Age Disc.) 
0.21 0.77 0.00 10.51 -0.25*** 0.05* -0.03 -0.07*** -0.05* 
16. Others’ Related Late-stage Failure Experience 
(Age Square Root Disc) 
98.87 86.57 0.00 268.00 0.27*** 0.03 0.16*** -0.01 0.17*** 
	 	 *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
6. Therapeutic Area Experience 1.00           
7. Rare Disease -0.04 1.00          
8. Therapeutic Area Risk -0.03 0.03 1.00         
9. Biological Origin Risk -0.00 0.05** 0.38*** 1.00        
10. R&D Investment (In Million $) 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.12*** 1.00       
11. First-Hand Success Experience 
(Age Square Disc.) 0.48*** -0.02 -0.20*** -0.09*** -0.05** 1.00 
     
12. First-Hand Early-Stage Failure Experience 
(Age Disc.) 0.40*** -0.02 0.04* 0.00 0.09*** -0.03 1.00 
    
13. First-Hand Medium-Stage Failure Experience 
(Age Disc.) 0.31*** -0.01 0.05* -0.00 0.10*** -0.03 0.04* 1.00 
   
14. First-Hand Late-Stage Failure Experience (No 
Disc.) 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.10*** 0.66*** -0.06** 0.06*** 0.09*** 1.00 
  
15. Others’ Related Success Experience 
(Age Disc.) 0.31*** -0.03 -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.01 0.58*** -0.01 -0.01 0.00 1.00 
 
16. Others’ Related Late-stage Failure Experience 
(Ages Square Root Disc) 0.04* 0.01 0.51*** 0.27*** 0.06*** -0.14*** 0.04* 0.08*** 0.05** -0.09*** 1.00 
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Table 2. Logistic Models Predicting Drug Failure 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
R&D Alliance -0.53 -0.50 -0.50 -0.53 -0.52 -0.48 -0.52 -0.52 -0.49 -0.49 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Year 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Organization’s Role -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.15 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.16 -0.17 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Percentage Failed -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Therapeutic Area Experience -0.07 -0.24 -0.20 -0.06 0.83 0.37 -0.13 -0.12 0.53 0.81 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.56) (0.58) (0.34) (0.34) (0.44) (0.57) 
Rare Disease -0.56 -0.54 -0.55 -0.53 -0.53 -0.49 -0.47 -0.44 -0.56 -0.55 
 (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) 
Therapeutic Area Risk 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Biological Origin Risk 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D Investment -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00* -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio -2.47* -2.46* -2.46* -2.15 -2.38* -2.05 -2.19* -1.83 -2.01 -2.02 
 (1.07) (1.07) (1.07) (1.10) (1.07) (1.09) (1.07) (1.10) (1.09) (1.08) 
First-hand early-stage failure experience (Age 
Disc.)  3.02    2.77     
  (1.93)    (2.05)     
First-hand medium-stage failure experience 
(Age Disc.)   2.23   1.80     
   (1.60)   (1.68)     
First-hand late-stage failure experience (No 
Disc.)    -0.11
*  -0.11*  -0.11*   
    (0.65)  (0.65)     
First-hand success experience (Age Square 
Disc.)     -2.17
** -1.68*    -0.91 
     (0.83) (0.83)    (0.95) 
Others’ related late-stage failure experience 
(Age Square Root Disc)       0.12
* 0.12*   
       (0.06) (0.06)   
Others’ related success experience (Age Disc.)         -0.67*** -0.63** 
         (0.08) (0.08) 
Wald Chi Square 217.18 221.22 220.45 225.93 222.66 238.17 224.77 230.16 235.09 235.11 
Log Likelihood -334.06 -332.04 -332.43 -329.69 -331.32 -323.57 -330.26 -327.57 -325.11 -325.09 
N 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 
Clusters 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Positive coefficients indicate that increases in the value of independent and control variables increase the probability of drug development failure and vice versa.*P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001.
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Figure 1: Hypotheses comparing different type of experience impact on the likelihood of future failure 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Effect of First-Hand Late-Stage Failure Experience on Project Failure. 
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Figure 3. Effect of First-Hand Success Experience on Project Failure. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Effect of Others’ Related Late-stage Failure Experience on Project Failure. 
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Figure 5. Effect of Others’ Related Success Experience on Project Failure. 
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Table 3. Robustness Test: Probit Models Predicting Drug Failure 
Variable Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
R&D Alliance -0.25 -0.23 -0.24 -0.26* -0.25* -0.24 -0.25 -0.26* -0.26* -0.27* 
Year 0.04* 0.03* 0.04* 0.05** 0.02 0.03* 0.03* 0.03 0.04* 0.05** 
Organization’s Role  0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Percentage Failed  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Therapeutic area experience  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Rare Disease -0.16 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.16 -0.12 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 -0.15 
Therapeutic Area Risk  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
Biological Origin Risk 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
R&D Investment  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
First-hand early-stage failure experience (Age Disc.)  1.63    1.74     
First-hand medium-stage failure experience (Age Disc.)   1.32   1.2     
First-hand late-stage failure experience (No Disc.)    -0.06*  -0.06*    -0.04 
First-hand success experience (Age Square Disc.)      -1.59*** -1.59***  -1.21***   
Others’ related success experience (Age Disc.)       -0.42*** -0.32**   
Others’ related late-stage failure experience (Age Square Root 
Disc)    
     0.08** 0.07* 
Wald Chi Square 226.99 249.93 226.94 226.90 226.02 247.11 226.75 245.80 228.81 228.07 
Log Likelihood -831.94 -817.30 -828.27 -829.88 -829.32 -809.27 -818.71 -812.44 -827.74 -826.36 
N 2750 2750 2750 2750 2750 2750 2750 2750 2750 2750 
Clusters 848 848 848 848 848 848 848 848 848 848 
Positive coefficients indicate that increases in the value of independent and control variables increase the probability of drug development failure and vice versa. 
*P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001. 
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